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Abstract
In a society, a proportion of the individuals can benefit from
creativity without being creative themselves by copying the
creators. This paper uses an agent-based model of cultural
evolution to investigate how society is affected by different
levels of individual creativity. We performed a time series
analysis of the mean fitness of ideas across the artificial
society varying both the percentage of creators, C, and how
creative they are, p using two discounting methods. Both
analyses revealed a valley in the adaptive landscape, indicating
a tradeoff between C and p. The results suggest that excess
creativity at the individual level can be detrimental at the level
of the society because creators invest in unproven ideas at the
expense of propagating proven ideas.
Keywords: adaptive landscape; agent-based model; creativity;
cultural evolution; discounting; EVOC; imitation; individual
differences; time series analysis
Introduction
Our capacity for self-expression, problem solving, and mak-
ing aesthetically pleasing artifacts, all stem from our creative
abilities. Psychologists have almost universally converged on
the definition of creativity proposed by Guilford over sixty
years ago at his annual address to the American Psycholog-
ical Association (Moran, 2011). Guilford defined creativity
in terms of two criteria: originality or novelty, and appro-
priateness or adaptiveness, i.e., relevance to the task at hand.
Individuals vary from not particularly creative to highly cre-
ative. Not only are humans individually creative, but we build
on each other’s ideas such that over centuries, art, science,
and technology, as well as customs and folk knowledge, can
be said to evolve (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Gabora,
1996; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Laland, 2006; Whiten, Hinde, La-
land, & Stringer, 2011). Creativity has long been associated
with personal fulfillment (May, 1975; Rogers, 1959), self-
actualization (Maslow, 1959), and maintaining a competitive
edge in the marketplace, and it is often assumed that more
creativity is necessarily better.
However, there are significant drawbacks to creativity
(Cropley, Cropley, Kaufman, & Runco, 2010; Ludwig, 1995).
Generating creative ideas is time consuming, and a creative
solution to one problem often generates other problems, or
has unexpected negative side effects that may only become
apparent after much effort has been invested. Creative peo-
ple often reinvent the wheel, and may be more likely to bend
rules, break laws, and provoke social unrest (Sternberg &
Lubart, 1995; Sulloway, 1996). They are more prone to af-
fective disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder, and
have a higher incidence of schizophrenic tendencies, than
other segments of the population (Andreason, 1987; Flaherty,
2005; Goodwin & Jamison, 1990).
Given these negative aspects of creativity, it is perhaps just
as well that, in a group of interacting individuals, not all of
them need be particularly creative for the benefits of creativ-
ity to be felt throughout a social group. The rest can reap
the rewards of the creator’s ideas by simply copying, using,
or admiring them. Few of us know how to build a computer,
or write a symphony, but they are nonetheless ours to use
and enjoy. Clearly if everyone relied on the strategy of imi-
tating others, the generation of cultural novelty would grind
to a halt. This raises the following questions: what is the
ideal ratio of creators to imitators, and how creative should
the “creative types” be?
The Model
We investigated this using an agent-based model of cultural
evolution referred to as “EVOlution of Culture”, abbrevi-
ated EVOC. To our knowledge, EVOC is the only computa-
tional model that enables one to create an artificial world with
agents of varying levels of creativity and observe the effect
of varying creativity on mean fitness and diversity of ideas
in the artificial society. It uses neural network based agents
that (1) invent new ideas, (2) imitate actions implemented by
neighbors, (3) evaluate ideas, and (4) implement successful
ideas as actions. EVOC is an elaboration of Meme and Vari-
ations, or MAV (Gabora, 1995), the earliest computer pro-
gram to model culture as an evolutionary process in its own
right, as opposed to modelling the interplay of cultural and
biological evolution1. The approach was inspired by genetic
1The approach can thus be contrasted with computer models of
how individual learning affects biological evolution (Best, 1999,
2006; Higgs, 1992; Hinton & Nowlan, 1992; Hutchins & Hazel-
hurst, 1991).
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algorithm (Holland, 1975), or GA. The GA is a search tech-
nique that finds solutions to complex problems by generating
a population of candidate solutions through processes akin to
mutation and recombination, selecting the best, and repeating
until a satisfactory solution is found. The goal behind MAV,
and also behind EVOC, was to distil the underlying logic of
not biological evolution but cultural evolution, i.e., the pro-
cess by which ideas adapt and build on one another in the
minds of interacting individuals. Agents do not evolve in a
biological sense–they neither die nor have offspring–but do
in a cultural sense, by generating and sharing ideas for ac-
tions. In cultural evolution, the generation of novelty takes
place through invention instead of through mutation and re-
combination as in biological evolution, and the differential
replication of novelty takes place through imitation, instead
of through reproduction with inheritance as in biological evo-
lution. EVOC has been used to address such questions as
how does the presence of leaders or barriers to the diffusion
of ideas affect cultural evolution.
We now summarize briefly the architecture of EVOC in
sufficient detail to explain our results; for further details
on the model, we refer the reader to previous publications
(Gabora, 1995, 2008a, 2008b; Gabora & Leijnen, 2009; Lei-
jnen & Gabora, 2009; Gabora & Saberi, 2011).
Agents
Agents consist of (1) a neural network, which encodes ideas
for actions and detects trends in what constitutes a fit action,
(2) a ‘perceptual system’, which carries out the evaluation and
imitation of neighbours’ actions, and (3) a body, consisting of
six body parts which implement actions. The neural network
is composed of six input nodes and six corresponding out-
put nodes that represent concepts of body parts (LEFT ARM,
RIGHT ARM, LEFT LEG, RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and HIPS),
and seven hidden nodes that represent more abstract concepts
(LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG, SYMMETRY, OPPOSITE, and
MOVEMENT). Input nodes and output nodes are connected
to hidden nodes of which they are instances (e.g., RIGHT
ARM is connected to RIGHT.) Each body part can occupy
one of three possible positions: a neutral or default positions,
and two other positions, which are referred to as active po-
sitions. Activation of any input node activates the MOVE-
MENT hidden node. Same-direction activation of symmetri-
cal input nodes (e.g., positive activation–which represents up-
ward motion–of both arms) activates the SYMMETRY node.
In the experiments reported here the OPPOSITE hidden node
was not used.
Invention
An idea for a new action is a pattern consisting of six elements
that dictate the placement of the six body parts. Agents gener-
ate new actions by modifying their initial action or an action
that has been invented previously or acquired through imita-
tion. During invention, the pattern of activation on the output
nodes is fed back to the input nodes, and invention is biased
according to the activations of the SYMMETRY and MOVE-
MENT hidden nodes. (Were this not the case there would
be no benefit to using a neural network.) To invent a new
idea, for each node of the idea currently represented on the
input layer of the neural network, the agent makes a proba-
bilistic decision as to whether the position of that body part
will change, and if it does, the direction of change is stochas-
tically biased according to the learning rate. If the new idea
has a higher fitness than the currently implemented idea, the
agent learns and implements the action specified by that idea.
Imitation
The process of finding a neighbour to imitate works through
a form of lazy (non-greedy) search. The imitating agent ran-
domly scans its neighbours, and adopts the first action that is
fitter than the action it is currently implementing. If it does
not find a neighbour that is executing a fitter action than its
own current action, it continues to execute the current action.
Evaluation
Following Holland (1975), we refer to the success of an ac-
tion in the artificial world as its fitness, with the caveat that
unlike its usage in biology, here the term is unrelated to num-
ber of offspring (or ideas derived from a given idea). Fitness
of an action is determined using a predefined equation, Eq. 1,
that ascribes a range of fitness values from 0 to 10 to the 729
possible actions. (Six body parts that can be in three possi-
ble positions gives a total of 729.) The fitness function used
in these experiments rewards activity of all body parts except
for the head, and symmetrical limb movement. Total body
movement, m, is calculated by adding the number of active
body parts, i.e., body parts not in the neutral position. The
fitness F of an action is calculated as follows:
Fnc = m+1.5(sa + st)+2(1−mh) (1)
sa = 1 if arms are moving symmetrically; 0 otherwise
st = 1 if legs are moving symmetrically; 0 otherwise
mh = 1 if head is stationary; 0 otherwise
Note that actions have a cultural version of what in biology is
referred to as epistasis, wherein what is optimal with respect
to one component depends on what is done with respect to
another. Epistasis occurs because what is optimal for the left
arm depends on what the right arm is doing, and vice versa,
and same for the legs.
Learning
Invention makes use of the ability to detect, learn, and re-
spond adaptively to trends. Since no action acquired through
imitation or invention is implemented unless it is fitter than
the current action, new actions provide valuable information
about what constitutes an effective idea. Knowledge acquired
through the evaluation of actions is translated into educated
guesses about what constitutes a successful action by updat-
ing the learning rate. For example, an agent may learn that
more overall movement tends to be either beneficial (as with
the fitness function used here) or detrimental, or that sym-
metrical movement tends to be either beneficial (as with the
fitness function used here) or detrimental, and bias the gener-
ation of new actions accordingly.
A Typical Run
Fitness of actions starts out low because agents are initially
immobile. They are all implementing the same action, with
all body parts in the neutral position; thus action diversity is
at a minimum. Soon some agent invents an action that has a
higher fitness than immobility, and this action gets imitated,
so fitness increases. Fitness increases further as other ideas
get invented, assessed, implemented as actions, and spread
through imitation. The diversity of actions increases due to
the proliferation of new ideas, and then decreases as agents
hone in on the fittest actions. In the version of the model
used here, fitness values hit a ceiling and converge2. Thus,
over successive rounds of invention and imitation, the agents’
actions improve. EVOC thereby models how “descent with
modification” occurs in a purely cultural context.
Experiments
To carry out our investigation of how varying the level of
creativity of individuals affects the fitness of ideas in soci-
ety as a whole, these experiments used a default artificial
world: a toroidal lattice with 1024 nodes, each occupied
by a single, stationary agent, and a von Neumann neighbor-
hood structure (agents only interacted with their four adjacent
neighbors). Creators and imitators were randomly dispersed.3
Runs lasted 100 iterations.
In an earlier version of EVOC, in which the ratio of in-
venting and imitating was always the same for all agents, we
found that the society as a whole did best when the ratio of
creating to imitating was approximately 2:1 (Gabora, 1995).
To incorporate individual differences in degree of creativity,
we constructed a version of EVOC that enables us to distin-
guish two types of agents: imitators, that only obtain new
actions by imitating neighbors, and creators, that obtain new
actions by either inventing one or by imitating a neighbor.
Imitators never invent at all; they simply copy the creators’
successful inventions. Thus all new actions are generated by
creators. We also made it possible to vary the probability that
creators create versus imitate; each agent can be a pure imi-
tator, a pure creator, or something in between. Whereas any
given agent is either a creator or an imitator throughout the
entire run, the proportion of creators innovating or imitating
in a given iteration fluctuates stochastically. The proportion
of creators relative to imitators in the society is referred to as
C. The creativity of the creators – that is, the probability that
a creator invents a new action instead of imitating a neighbor
– is referred to as p. If a creator decides to invent on a partic-
2This is not the case for another version of the model (Gabora &
Saberi, 2011).
3In other experiments (Leijnen & Gabora, 2009) we investigated
the results of clustering creators.
ular iteration, the probability of changing the position of any
body part involved in an action is 1/6.4
The society consists of three subgroups:
• C× p×N creators attempting to innovate
• C× (1− p)×N creators attempting to imitate
• (1−C)×N imitators attempting to imitate
where the number of agents, N is 1024.
In previous investigations we measured, for different val-
ues of C and p, the diversity of ideas over the course of a
run. We found that the cultural diversity, i.e., the number
of different ideas implemented by one or more agent(s), was
positively correlated with both the proportion of creators to
imitators, and with how creative the creators were. We also
obtained suggestive evidence that when creators are relatively
uncreative, the mean fitness of ideas increases as a function
of the percentage of creators in the society, but when cre-
ators are highly creative, the society appears to be better off
with fewer creators (Leijnen & Gabora, 2009). However,
those simulations were performed with small societies (100
agents), and since action fitness was obtained at only one time
slice (after 50 iterations) for all ratios of creators to inventors,
these results did not reflect the dynamics of the time series.
Given a set of series of accumulating value over time, it is
unclear which series is most representative. The series cannot
be unambiguously ordered unless for each pair of series one
strictly dominates the other, and that is not the case here; the
curves representing mean fitness at different values of {C, p}
increase monotonically but they often cross and re-cross as
time progresses. Thus here we present a more extensive in-
vestigation of the relationship between creativity and society
as a whole that employs a sophisticated solution to the time
series problem.
Analysis
We used time series discounting which associates a “present
value” with any future benefit such that the present value of
any given benefit diminishes as a function of elapsed time un-
til the benefit is realized (McDonald & Siegel, 1986). The
standard approach in financial settings is exponential dis-
counting. Given a series of benefits bt , the Net Present Value
(NPV) is defined as:
NPV (b) =
N
∑
t=1
rt−1bt with 0 < r ≤ 1 (2)
The discount rate r is normally set as r = ( 100+i100 )
−1 where
i is the interest rate (in percentage) for the unit period that an
investor can obtain from a safe investment.
This basic idea was adapted to analyze the benefit ac-
crued by attaining fit actions for different values of C and
4This gave on average a probability of one change per newly
invented action, which previous experiments (Gabora, 1995) showed
to be optimal.
p in EVOC. The first discounting method used was Time-to-
Threshold (TTT) discounting. Since all fitness trajectories
were monotonically increasing, those that reached a reason-
ably high threshold τ sooner should be valued higher. We
measured how many iterations (time to threshold) it took for
fitness to reach τ. For these runs, τ= 9 was used as a measure
of optimal fitness to allow for a realistic averaging over time.
Whereas imitators need creators, creators should ignore
others if they could do better on their own (p = 1). In other
words, the fitness prospects of creators working alone can be
viewed in a manner analogous to the interest yield of treasury
bonds in investment decisions. This logic suggests another
kind of modification of the standard discounting method. The
second adaptation to the basic notion of discounting we refer
to as Present Innovation Value (PIV) discounting. Let FC,pt
be the mean action fitness at period t for parameter setting
{C, p}. Note that F1,1t is the fitness expectation with no in-
teraction amongst agents. We define the PIV for any fitness
curve as:
PIV (FC,p) =−N +
N
∑
t=1
FC,p
F1,1
(3)
Therefore, PIV (F1,1) = 0; creators are indifferent to work-
ing alone or in a community with imitation.
Results
All results are averages across 100 runs. The 3D graph and
contour plot for the log10 TTT discounting analysis of the
time series for different C, p settings are shown in Figures 1
and 2 respectively. Note that by definition a low TTT value
corresponds to high mean fitness of actions across the society.
The TTT method clearly demonstrates a valley in the adaptive
landscape. The line running along the bottom of the valley in
Figure 2 indicates, for any given value of p the optimal value
for C, and vice versa. When p = 1 the optimal values of
C = 0.38. When C = 1 the optimal values of p is 0.19. The
global optimum is at approximately {C, p}= {0.4,1.0}.
The 3D graph and contour plot for the PIV discounting
analysis of the time series for different C, p settings are shown
in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. The pattern is very similar to
that obtained with the log10 TTT discounting analysis.
Thus both log10 TTT and PIV analyses of the time se-
ries showed that, although some creativity is essential to get
the fitness of cultural novelty increasing over time, more cre-
ativity is not necessarily better. For optimal mean fitness of
agents actions across the society there is a tradeoff between
C, the proportion of creators in the artificial society, and p,
how creative these creators are.
Discussion and Future Directions
This investigation yielded results that contradict the
widespread assumption that creativity is necessarily desir-
able. The model is highly idealized, and caution must be
taken in extrapolating to human societies. The PIV results
assume that creators avoid input from neighbors if doing so
Figure 1: 3D graph of the log10 Time-to-Threshold (TTT)
landscape of the average mean fitness for different values of C
and p, with τ= 9. The valley in the fitness landscape indicates
that the optimal values of C and p for the society as a whole
are less than their maximum values for most C, p settings.
would maximize the fitness of their actions. In reality, cre-
ative individuals may not behave so rationally. However, the
PIV results were corroborated by the TTT results, indicating
that the basic pattern does not depend on the assumption of
economic rationality.
EVOC agents are too rudimentary to suffer the affective
penalties of creativity but the model incorporates another im-
portant drawback to creativity mentioned in the introduction:
an iteration spent inventing is an iteration not spent imitat-
ing. Creative agents, absorbed in their creative process, ef-
fectively rupture the fabric of the artificial society; they act as
insulators that impede the diffusion of proven solutions. Imi-
tators, in contrast, serve as a cultural memory that ensures the
preservation of successful ideas. This suggests that the reason
people are not more creative than they are is not just because
it is difficult to be creative; there is a cost to society as well.
Our results suggest that families, organizations, or soci-
eties may self-organize to achieve levels of both imitation and
creativity that are intermediate in order to achieve a balance
between continuity and change. The results suggest that im-
itation is neither just the greatest compliment, nor a form of
free-riding, but a valuable social mechanism that serves inno-
vators and imitators alike. Without invention there is nothing
to imitate, but invention is considerably more effective in con-
junction with imitation.
Limitation of this work include that the fitness function was
static throughout a run, and agents had only one action to op-
timize. In real life, there are many tasks, and a division of
labor such that each agent specializes in a few tasks, and imi-
tates other agents to carry out other tasks. Another limitation
is that EVOC currently does not allow an agent to imitate only
Figure 2: Top-view contour plot of the log10 Time-to-
Threshold (TTT) landscape of the average mean fitness for
different values of C and p, with τ = 9. The line, obtained
by visually extrapolating over minimum values C and p, in-
dicates the set of optima.
certain features of an idea while retaining features the idea it
is currently implementing. Creative change can break up co-
adapted partial solutions. Recall that actions have a cultural
version of what in biology is referred to as epistasis, wherein
what is optimal with respect to one component depends on
what is done with respect to another. Once both components
have been optimized in a mutually beneficial way (for exam-
ple, the arms are moving symmetrically), excess creativity
can cause co-adapted partial solutions to break down. In fu-
ture studies we will investigate the effects of using a dynamic
fitness function, and enabling partial imitation. We will also
compare our findings to real world data.
If it is the case that social groups can be too creative for
their own good, then expensive and widely used programs
to enhance creativity through methods such as brainstorm-
ing may be counterproductive. The results of these exper-
iments help make sense of findings that creativity is often
suppressed in the classroom and in society at large, and that
creative individuals often experience discrimination, or worse
(Craft, 2005; Cropley & Cropley, 2005; Scott, 1999; Tor-
rance, 1963b, 1963a). (It is well-known that Einstein’s disser-
tation was rejected by the Techniche Hochschule in Vienna;
he wrote his papers on relativity while working at a patent
office.) On the other hand, once the merits of ones’ creative
efforts become known, this individual’s creativity is generally
supported or even idolized. In future work we plan to inves-
tigate the hypothesis that the social practice of discouraging
creativity until the creative individual has proven him- or her-
self serves as a form of social self-regulation ensuring that
Figure 3: 3D graph of the Present Innovation Value (PIV)
landscape of the average mean fitness for different values of
C and p. Since the x axis has been inverted to aid visibility
of the adaptive landscape, the valley again indicates that the
optimal values of C and p for the society as a whole are less
than their maximum values for most C, p settings.
creative efforts are not squandered. Specifically, we will use
EVOC to test the hypothesis that if individuals who generate
creative outputs of low fitness fitness are exposed to social
pressures that discourage creativity, and individuals who gen-
erate creative outputs of high fitness fitness are encouraged to
be creative, the society may self-organize such that it achieves
a balance of creative and uncreative individuals (such as the
C, p values indicated by the red line in our experiments).
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